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Green Payment Programs for
Nonpoint Source Pollution Control:
How Important Is Targeting
for Cost-Effectiveness?
Kenneth A. Baerenklau
Mechanism design theory is used to examine the case of a cost-minimizing regulator
who uses input-reduction subsidies to meet an exogenously imposed ambient standard
for nonpoint  source pollution. A general result claimed  for a welfare-maximizing
regulator is clarified to show that an optimal contract scheme may involve a pooling
equilibrium. Numerical results suggest the ability to directly target contracts reduces
costs significantly for the regulator. But in the absence of this ability, indirect target-
ing reduces costs only slightly.
Key words: ambient standard, cost minimization, input-reduction subsidy, mechanism
design, nonpoint source pollution, targeting
Introduction and Background
Point source pollution of surface and groundwater resources has received the majority
of regulatory attention in the past few decades. This emphasis on point source pollution
is largely because nonpoint source (NPS) pollution is much more difficult to control. The
sources of observed ambient NPS pollution are diffuse, and therefore difficult to identify
and monitor. Further, the mechanism by which NPS pollution migrates from its sources
into the environment is site-specific and stochastic. It is not surprising, then, that the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has labeled NPS pollution as the "greatest source
of water quality problems in the United States today" (p. 52).
Considerable academic research on NPS pollution control has focused on market-based
pollution incentives.  Work on ambient taxes and subsidies dates back to Tietenberg's
reply to Baumol and Oates' 1971 theorem regarding the efficiency of a uniform pollution
tax. In 1988,  Segerson contributed a seminal paper which incorporates both taxes and
subsidies with a flat penalty, and Xepapadeas (1991, 1992, 1995) has examined various
stochastic-dynamic elements of subsidy and penalty schemes. Marketable permits and
point-nonpoint trading also continue to receive a significant amount of attention in the
literature, with some of the more often-cited works including analyses by Shortle (1987,
1990); Letson; and Malik, Letson, and Crutchfield.
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Each of these market-based approaches unfortunately has serious practical problems
that limit applicability to NPS pollution control in the field-including significant
information costs, the use of Draconian penalties, scarcity of permit traders, and the
issue of establishing an appropriate  trading ratio. In light of these difficulties,  some
researchers instead have considered voluntary  "green payment" programs which are
much more common in practice. Essentially, these programs offer subsidies to polluters
who voluntarily choose to adopt less-polluting (but often more expensive, less productive,
or higher variability) production practices.  Research in this area has focused on either
input-reduction subsidies or cost-sharing programs for the installation and maintenance
of less-polluting technologies  (often called "best management practices").
Malik and Shoemaker were first to examine the problem of designing an economically
efficient cost-sharing program to control agricultural  NPS pollution.  Their model
assumes each profit-maximizing agent operates a farm with heterogeneous land quality
on which two different technologies may be employed: a "cleaner" technology that is more
productive on lower quality land, and a "dirtier" technology that is more productive on
higher quality land. The regulator's  goal is to choose  the ranges of land quality over
which each technology may be employed as well as the technology subsidies which maxi-
mize net social benefits subject to an ambient pollution standard.
In a different approach to a similar problem, Wu and Babcock use mechanism design
theory1 to examine the case of profit-maximizing agents operating heterogeneous farms
with homogeneous land quality (i.e., there is a distribution of land quality across farms
but not within a single farm). The regulator's problem is to specify a set of incentive-
compatible and individually rational contracts (xi, so) that maximizes net social welfare
from agricultural production and pollution. The term xi represents a vector of per acre
inputs and s, is the associated per acre subsidy.
The incentive  compatibility requirement  is a result of the information asymmetry
inherent in the NPS pollution control problem. Specifically, while each farmer knows
his own resource  endowment,  the regulator  effectively does not.2 Therefore, because
incentives may exist for farmers  to misrepresent their resource endowments  to take
advantage of government subsidies, the regulator must specify self-selecting contracts
if she wishes  to separate  farmers according  to their resource  endowments.  If such a
separation is not desired, these constraints are unnecessary and the regulator simply
bunches the agents together  and treats them as a single group.  When the regulator
chooses the former contract scheme, the solution is said to be "separating," and when
she chooses the latter, the solution is said to be "pooling."
In their analysis, Wu and Babcock state, "Chambers (1992) and Guesnerie and Seade
(1982) have shown that with only two groups  bunching is not optimal if the govern-
ment's objective depends on the payment level, si" (p. 319).  The present study seeks to
clarify this result by showing how a pooling contract can be optimal, and by assessing
the relative cost-effectiveness  of different contract mechanisms.
1Smith and Tomasi (1995, 1999) also have applied principles of mechanism design to the problem of nonpoint source pollu-
tion control.
2 This may be because it is prohibitively costly for the regulator to obtain such information, or because the regulator must
appear to be "fair" by offering all agents the same contract menu, thus effectively eliminating the ability  to directly target
contracts based  on farm-specific  information  even if it is known. This latter justification  is cited by Chambers.  It also is
acknowledged by regulators in Wisconsin's Priority Watershed Program, a state-level cost-sharing program tasked with con-
trolling NPS pollution.
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Because regulators typically are not explicitly faced with welfare maximization, but
rather with the dual problem of cost minimization subject to an ambient constraint,3 this
analysis adopts the latter framework.  Numerical results suggest (a) if the regulator is
able to target contracts directly at specific agents, and thus achieve the first-best separ-
ating solution, total subsidy costs are significantly lower than for the optimal second-
best solution; and (b) if instead the regulator is able to target contracts only indirectly,
and thus achieve the second-best separating solution, total subsidy costs are only slightly
lower than for the optimal pooling solution.
Problem Framework and Notation 4
Consider the case where agents possess the same preferences and objectives but different
resource  endowments.  Specifically,  assume that each  agent  is a price-taking  profit-
maximizer endowed with a fixed  quantity of homogeneous  land,  and that land types
differ across agents along two dimensions: productivity  (i) and pollution potential (j),
as shown in the illustration below.5
For any given level of inputs, it is assumed type 2j land produces more output, generates
larger profits, and has larger marginal productivities relative to type lj land. Type i2
land produces more emissions and has a larger marginal impact on ambient pollution
relative to type i 1  land. Also assume all agents employ the same types of variable inputs
to generate the same type of output.
Letting x denote a vector of per acre inputs, w the vector of input prices, and p the
output price, each agent's private per acre profit-maximization problem (without govern-
ment intervention)  may be stated as follows:
(1)  =i  = max[pfi(x) - w'x],  i = 1,  2,
x
where f(  ) is the twice differentiable, increasing and strictly concave production function
for type ij land. Because agents disregard pollution potential, j  does not appear in the
optimization problem. Also note that the productivity assumptions imply:
(2)  f 2(x)> fL(x),  Vx>
and
(3)  af  2(x)/axk > afi(x)/axk,  Vx and Vk.
3 This duality is not presented here formally, but is easily derived using straightforward algebraic manipulations of either
problem statement.
4 Throughout, this analysis relies heavily on the notation used in Wu and Babcock.
5 The analysis may be extended  to include additional land types and heterogeneous endowments  for each agent, but the
simplifications employed here are convenient for the analysis that follows.
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The regulator's problem is to present the agents with a menu of per acre input-reduc-
tion subsidy contracts (x,, si; i = 1, 2) which minimizes the regulator's cost of achieving
the ambient standard.6 Note that these contracts are indexed by land productivity but
not by pollution potential because pollution potential does not enter the agent's objective
function, whereas productivity enters throughfi(-). Letting n 0i denote the number of acres
of type ij land, the regulator's problem may be stated as:
(4)  min[  nijsi
xisi  i  j
s.t.:  h(nij, z(x i)) <  A.
Here, A is the ambient standard and h(-) is the ambient pollution function assumed to
depend on the number of acres of each type of land,  nji,  and the pollution produced by
each type of land on a per acre basis, zj(Xi). 7Assume both h(.)  and each zj(x,) are twice
differentiable  and increasing functions. Also note that the pollution potential assump-
tions imply:
(5)  z2(X) > Z(X),  Vx >
and
(6)  az2(x)/lxk > azl(x)/axk,  V x  and V k that pollute.
Assuming the regulator knows nij, but either cannot identify the type of any individual
parcel of land or cannot directly target contracts at specific agents for reasons such as
those mentioned earlier (see footnote 2), additional constraints must be added to ensure
contracts intended for type ij land are accepted by agents who actually operate type ij
land. In principal-agent theory, these constraints are referred to as "individual ration-
ality" and "incentive compatibility" constraints. The individual rationality constraints
guarantee that agents operating type ij land prefer accepting the contract intended for
type ij land as opposed to rejecting it. These constraints may be written as:
(7)  Tl(xl) + 81 >2 l(XO),
(8)  TC 2(x2)  + s2  Ž> 2(X2),
where x4 denotes the solution to the agent's optimization problem without government
intervention.  The incentive  compatibility constraints ensure agents operating type ij
land prefer contracts intended for type ij land as opposed to contracts intended for any
other type of land. These constraints may be written as:
(9)  Tl(x 1)  + s1 2  Tt 1(X 2)  + S2,
(10)  T 2(X2)  + S2  >2  12(xl)  + s1.
Again, because agents disregard pollution potential, j  does not appear in any of these
constraints.
6 Such standards are ubiquitous in environmental regulation (e.g.,  Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act standards in the
United States) and provide motivation for using this more realistic constrained optimization problem framework.
7 This representation  allows for each of the four land types to contribute a different amount of emissions to the ambient
concentration.
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Optimality with Perfect Information
and No Targeting Constraints
With perfect information and no targeting constraints, the regulator can identify the type
of each parcel of land and can assign the appropriate contract to each agent. Therefore
a pooling solution cannot be optimal. Furthermore,  there is no need for the incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints, although the individual rationality (IR) constraints remain
important. The Lagrangian for the regulator's problem with perfect information may be
stated as:
(11)  L  = -ns  - n2 2 + A[A  - h(nj, zj(x))]  + p[ 1(x 1) + s  - T(x  )]
+ p2 [7 2 (X 2 )  + S2  -2  X2)
where ni = Ijnij. Furthermore,  assume the regulator has the ability to sign contracts
only for a single production input, x,. Letting x* = x*(p, w, xk) denote each agent's opti-
mal input choices given the regulator's choice ofXik, algebraic manipulations of (11) give
the following set of necessary conditions for an interior solution  (Xik,  s7; i = 1,  2):
~~(12)  nl* (Oal/ax)lk)  n
2 *(an2/oX2k)
ahlaxlk  I  ahlax2 Oh/Oxlk  x  Oh/ox2k  X
(13)  h(nj, z(x  ))  =A,
(14)  s1  =  rr(xo)  - t(x 1),
(15)  2 =  T(x2)  - T2(x2).
Conditions (12) and (13) define two loci of points (x^, x).  The locus defined by (12) gives
the cost-minimizing allocation of inputs for all possible ambient standards. Notice that
(12)  is the optimality  condition requiring  the regulator's  marginal  cost  of reducing
ambient pollution to be equalized across land types. The locus defined by (13) gives all
possible allocations  of inputs meeting a given ambient standard. Therefore, the inter-
section of these two loci gives the regulator's optimal input levels. Optimal payments are
then given by conditions  (14) and (15), the IR constraints:  si* = 7i(x°)  - 7tI(x ), i = 1, 2.
Optimality with Imperfect Information
or Targeting Constraints
Assuming the regulator knows nii,  but either has imperfect information and therefore
cannot identify the type of any individual parcel of land or, equivalently, cannot assign
contracts to specific  agents (see footnote 2),  she must rely on both the IC and IR con-
straints to implement a cost-effective second-best mechanism. Wu and Babcock (p. 319)
show that in any feasible mechanism under imperfect information, the IC constraints
and productivity assumptions imply x^ >  x*.  When both IC constraints bind, xk = xk
and the mechanism is therefore pooling (i.e., only one contract is offered); when no more
than one IC constraint binds, x^ > x* and the mechanism is therefore  separating (i.e.,
two contracts are offered).
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As mentioned previously, for the constrained cost-minimizing regulator with perfect
information and no targeting constraints, a pooling solution cannot be optimal. However,
this result does not hold for the constrained cost-minimizing regulator with imperfect
information or targeting constraints. Under certain conditions, the optimal separating
solution in this case collapses to an optimal pooling solution.
Optimal Separating  Mechanism
In a separating mechanism,  the regulator offers two contracts,  and therefore both IR
and IC constraints must be included. The Lagrangian for this case may be stated as
follows:
(16)  L =  -ns  -n  n2 +  [A-h(ni, zj(xi))]  + l1[l(xl) + s1  - n(x  )]
+  2 1T2 (X 2)  + 
S2-  I 2 (x)]  + Ps3[1(Xl) 
+ S1-  1(X 2 ) -S2]
+  ^4[t1 2(X2)  +S2  - (X 1 ) -Si]
One possible solution to this problem framework already has been addressed in the
perfect information  case. When this first-best  solution  is not feasible, a second-best
separating solution instead may exist. Given the productivity  assumptions presented
earlier and some additional regularity conditions (that are satisfied, for example, iffi(.)
is homothetic),8 equation (16) can be manipulated to give the following necessary
conditions for the second-best separating solution, where n = Si Ej nij is the total number
of acres:
(17)  n  *(anil/axlk)  n  *(axr 2/ax 2k) - n1*(·Ol/x2k)
ahl  axk^  ah/ax 2k  X2
(18)  h(nij, zj(x)) =A,
(19)  S 2 =  12(X2)  - C2(X2),
(20)  s  $  = T1(x2)  - T71(x)  + S2.
Condition (17) is again an optimality condition requiring the equalization of marginal
abatement  costs  across  land types,  taking into account  the  premium  being  paid to
agents with lower productivity land in order to make the contract menu incentive
compatible. Condition (18) is the ambient constraint, and condition (19) is the IR
constraint for agents with higher productivity land. Condition (20) is the IC constraint
for agents with lower productivity land, and requires the premium they receive be
minimized.
8 Homotheticity offi(-) is sufficient but not necessary for the results that follow.
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Optimal Pooling  Mechanism
In  a pooling mechanism,  the regulator offers only one contract,  and hence the IC
constraints may be omitted.9 Thus, the Lagrangian is similar to that under perfect infor-
mation, but now there are only two choice variables, xk and s:
(21)  L  = -ns +  [A - h(nij, zj(x))]  + p1[l(x) + s - l(X)]
+  2 [ 2 (x)  (+  s  -2()].
Algebraic manipulations  of (21) give the following  set of necessary  conditions for an
interior solution (Xk,  s*):
(22)  h(ni,  zj(x*))  =  A,
(23)  s*  2(2)  - 2(
Condition (22) is the ambient constraint, and condition (23) is the IR constraint for the
higher productivity land.10 This is a relatively simple problem for the regulator-first,
determine the maximum common per acre input level  that will achieve the ambient
standard, and then determine the minimum common payment that will induce both types
of agents to sign contracts.
Optimality of Separating  versus Pooling Solutions
If the first-best separating solution (Sl) is feasible, then it must be optimal because it
corresponds to the perfect information case with no targeting constraints. The additional
separating (S2) and pooling solutions are second-best mechanisms and correspond to the
case of imperfect information and/or targeting constraints. Consequently, in theory, the
S2 and pooling solutions are less desirable from the regulator's perspective. The pooling
mechanism is simpler because it consists of a single contract offer and therefore involves
no targeting. The S2 mechanism is more complicated because  it consists of a menu of
contracts and thus involves "indirect" targeting-i.e.,  all agents select from the same
menu, but the menu is designed such that all agents of the same type choose the same
contract.
When the S1 solution is not feasible, it is possible to derive conditions under which
the S2 mechanism collapses to an optimal pooling solution. To do this, it is convenient
to examine the pooling solution and determine whether there exists a feasible S2
mechanism in a neighborhood  of that solution.  When no such mechanism exists, an
additional convexity condition is sufficient to establish global optimality of the pooling
solution. 11
9  This statement may appear to contradict the preceding claim that both IC constraints must bind in a pooling equilibrium,
but it does not. Substituting the pooling contract  (xk,  s') into the IC constraints shows both are satisfied automatically in a
pooling equilibrium.
10  Given the assumptions of this model, it can be shown that higher productivity land will experience a greater per acre
loss for any common input level which supports a cost-effective  pooling solution. Therefore, the IR constraint for type 2j land
binds, and the IR constraint for type lj land is slack.
11 A discussion  of this sufficiency condition is given in appendix A.
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The algebraic condition under which the S2 mechanism collapses to an optimal pooling
solution is derived in appendix A and may be stated as follows:
(24)  n*ahlaX 2k  >  n*(nC2/Ox2k)  - n1*(OT91/Xl1k)
ah/aXlk  x*  nl*(9al/axl)  Xk
where x* is the optimal input level in the pooling solution, and n is the total number of
acres.  2From this condition, three factors are shown to influence the relative optimality
of pooling versus S2 solutions: (a) relative pollution potential, (b) relative productivity,
and (c) number of acres of each land type.
For a given productivity differential and distribution of land types, the left-hand side
of condition (24) becomes large as the ambient concentration becomes more sensitive to
emissions from high-productivity land. In such a case, even a small positive increase in
pollution from high-productivity  land must be  offset by a large decrease  in pollution
from low-productivity land that is expensive for the regulator to subsidize. Thus, pooling
tends to be optimal. In the limit, the left-hand side of (24) approaches infinity, in which
case pooling always is optimal. Conversely, as the ambient concentration becomes less
sensitive to emissions from high-productivity land, the left-hand size becomes small and
separating tends to be optimal.  In the limit, the left-hand side approaches  zero and
pooling never is optimal because the right-hand side must be nonnegative.
For a given pollution potential differential  and distribution of land types, the right-
hand side of condition  (24) becomes small when the productivity differential is small.
When there is no productivity differential (i.e., when there is only one land productivity
type), the right-hand side equals zero and pooling always is optimal. Conversely, when
high-productivity land is much more productive than low-productivity land, the right-
hand side of (24) becomes large and separating tends to be optimal. In such a case, even
a small increase in emissions from high-productivity land is valued greatly by these land
operators, and therefore confers on the regulator significant savings. Thus, even a large
decrease in emissions from low-productivity land can be subsidized while still lowering
total costs.
For given productivity  and pollution potential differentials, the distribution of land
types has competing effects. As the amount of high-productivity  land increases,  both
numerators become larger while both denominators remain fixed, and thus both sides
increase. As the amount of low-productivity land increases, the left-hand denominator
becomes larger while the numerator remains fixed and the entire right-hand side
becomes smaller; thus both sides decrease. The net effect of changes in the distribution
of land types therefore is ambiguous for the general case.
Discussion
The preceding results can be summarized as follows. If a feasible Si mechanism exists,
it must be optimal  because  it is equivalent to the perfect  information  case with  no
targeting constraints. When no such mechanism exists, then if a feasible S2 mechanism
12 Reversing the inequality results in an existence condition for a feasible S2 mechanism.  An analogous condition for a
feasible S1 mechanism is not addressed here, but would be a useful extension.
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exists, it must be optimal because the pooling solution is simply a special case of an S2
mechanism (i.e., the S2 solution must be at least as desirable as the pooling solution).
When no feasible S2 mechanism exists, then the pooling solution is optimal.l3
These results provide practical usefulness. By knowing what types of solutions may
be optimal in this framework,  some interesting empirical questions may be addressed.
For example, how do the costs of a typical green payment program compare with what
is achievable in this framework? Specifically, how much "room for improvement" is there
in a typical green payment program? And how would changes in the ambient standard
for a particular watershed affect total program costs for that watershed? Answers to
these questions, of course, depend on the specific characteristics of the watershed of con-
cern, and require data regarding production functions, the ambient pollution function,
and the distribution of land types for that watershed.
However,  it is possible to examine without detailed  empirical information how the
second-best  solutions in this framework compare with the first-best solution-in other
words, to examine the magnitude of the loss generated by information asymmetry and/
or the inability to target contracts directly for political reasons.
Ideally, it would be desirable to place theoretical bounds  on the additional cost
incurred under a second-best solution versus a first-best solution. This would measure
either the value of acquiring additional information necessary for a first-best solution,
or the cost imposed on the regulator (and thus  on other social programs  from which
funding is redirected) by political barriers which prohibit direct targeting.  But finding
such theoretical bounds is a fairly daunting task because it involves comparing the solu-
tions to systems of implicit functions defined by the first-order conditions corresponding
to different problems. While it would be somewhat easier to assume specific and rela-
tively simple functional forms, here numerical examples are used to cast some light on
the relative magnitude of the loss.
Details of two numerical examples are given in appendix B, but both imply the
increased cost imposed on the regulator due to the inability to target contracts directly
is relatively large. In the first example, budgetary outlays for the optimal second-best
solution are about 125% larger than for the first-best solution ($39.62 versus $17.57).
In the second example, the increase is about 80% ($6.96 versus $3.86). These results,
although derived from stylized examples, suggest efforts by regulators to acquire detailed
information regarding resource endowments and to resist political pressures to treat
farmers "fairly" may be well justified.
Based on the numerical results when direct targeting is not an option, indirect
targeting, when possible, can produce only modest cost reductions. In the first example,
where indirect targeting is possible, the regulator realizes a cost reduction of only
about 1% by moving from the optimal pooling solution ($39.95) to the optimal feas-
ible S2 solution ($39.62).  To the extent that a menu of contracts is more costly to
develop and administer in practice, these results reveal that pooling contracts may
be preferred in even more cases than would be indicated by the theoretical results
presented earlier.
13 Note, although the pooling solution is a unique case of an S2 mechanism, it is not optimal merely at a single point, but
rather over an infinite range defined by condition (24).
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Summary and Conclusion
This analysis derives the necessary conditions describing the candidate solutions to a
class ofnonpoint source pollution control problems. Under certain conditions, the optimal
contract mechanism for a constrained cost-minimizing regulator will involve a pooling
equilibrium. This result illustrates the possibility that, when direct targeting of green
payment programs is not possible, simpler arrangements offering fewer choices may be
able to achieve an ambient standard at the lowest possible cost. Though not conclusive,
the numerical results presented here lend support to efforts to overcome barriers to
first-best mechanisms because direct targeting appears to produce significant cost
savings for regulators. The same results also suggest second-best separating solutions
may provide only slight cost savings over simpler pooling solutions, implying the returns
to indirect targeting efforts may be small.
[Received March 2002;  final  revision received  August 2002.]
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Appendix A:
Derivation and Discussion  of the Optimality
Condition for a Pooling Solution
Start with the ambient pollution function:  h(ni,  zj(x i)) =  A. Take the total derivative in (xlk, x2k)  space:
ah/axlk *dxlk +  ahlax 2k *dx2k  = 0. Rearranging gives the slope of the constraint:
dx2  _  h/lxlk
dx1k  Oh/OX 2k
Recalling that the IR constraint for high-productivity land must bind, the incremental subsidy
required  to move  high-productivity  land operators  from the pooling  solution to a nearby feasible S2
mechanism  is given by:
S2  =  ~2(X2)  - 22(X2)
-2(X2)  - 2(X;)  + T2(X  )-  2(X  )
=  Sp  +  2(x)  - (X2)
As  =  T2(Xp)  - x2(X*).
Taking the first-order approximation  gives:  As 2 = -x 2(X  p)/axk *dx2 ^.
Recalling that the IC constraint for low-productivity  land operators must bind, the incremental
subsidy required to move low-productivity land operators from the pooling solution to a nearby feasible
S2 mechanism is given by:









AS1 =  Tl 1(x)  - sx(x;)  + AS 2
=  [t 1(X2)  - T1(X)]  - [T 1 (X)  - 1 2(X)]  +  AS2.
Again taking the first-order approximation, and noting that dxlk < 0, gives:
a7r,(x  )  a  (x  ) As  x  *  dx 2 - ,(  ;  dxlk +  As 2
=_  xl(X)  *  (dxlk +dx2 ,) - (x  * dx2k '
aXk  aXk
Because the pooling solution is a degenerate case of an S2 mechanism, it is optimal if and only if any
attempt to move to a nearby feasible S2 mechanism results in higher costs to the regulator (i.e., if and
only if n1 *  As  +  n2 *As 2> 0). Substituting the preceding results into this inequality gives:
an1(x  (X)  _  *  - [7(X)
*  *-  · (d(xlk +  dx2k)  2  -(x  *dx2k  - n2 *  dx 2 > 0. |  ax  axk ax  k
Rearranging gives:
a-n  T(xp)  a  (xp)  ]  [ aOr(x) -n·  - ,*  dx1k  >(n 1+n2)*  *  dx2  - 1 * nl  *  dx2k
axk  a]x  a  Ox
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Noting that anl(xp)/axk > 0, and dx2k > 0, rearranging further gives:
an(X )  al* (x)
dxkl  >  aXk  aXk  >0
dx2k  axl(x;)




dxlk  ah/ax 2^
yields:
an  (x;)  an(x;)
ah/ax2k  aXk  aXk




Condition (Al) is both necessary and sufficient for local optimality of the pooling solution. An addi-
tional condition sufficient to establish global  optimality of a pooling solution that satisfies (Al) may be
derived as follows. Consider again the regulator's  problem, and assume the implicit function theorem
holds so that the regulator's total cost function may be written as:
TC  = min  [nls(s 2 Ip, w, A, nij,  ) + n2s2 ]
S
2
where 0 is a vector of parameters describing the production, per acre pollution, and ambient pollution
functions.  This exposition makes clear that the regulator's problem essentially involves choosing only
a single variable, s2. Selection of s2 determines x2 through the IR constraint for type 2j land; x2 then
determines x1 through the ambient constraint; and xi then determines Si through the IC constraint for
type lj land. Suppressing some notation and taking the derivative of TC with respect to 82 gives the
first-order necessary condition for cost minimization, as well as the slope of SI(s2 1 ) at a candidate
solution:
arTC  asi  asi  n
n  +  n 2 = 0  =<  0. 1  2 aso  as2  *  aso I n2 2  s2 ~8 2  s2 0  2;  nl
2 2  2
Notice this expression implies s1(s 2 *)  is downward sloping at a candidate solution, which makes sense.
A smaller payment to one agent type means that type will make a smaller input reduction. The other
agent type must then make a larger input reduction to meet the ambient constraint, and this larger
reduction requires a larger payment.
Taking the second derivative gives the second-order sufficient condition establishing  s2 as a global
minimum:
a2TC  a2Sl  a281
21 >  -n  > 0.
as  s2  2  as 2
2  2  2
In other words, s,(s2 1 ) must be globally convex. Although it may be difficult to establish this property
algebraically,  an intuitive argument confirms it holds if the production  functions are strictly concave
and the ambient constraint is concave in (xl^,  x2)  space. First, recall that a decrease in s2  implies a
necessary increase  in si because  of the ambient constraint.  Moreover,  a strictly concave  production
function implies inputs become increasingly valuable to producers as their usage levels decline. This
means input reduction becomes increasingly expensive to subsidize as input levels decrease. Combining
these two results demonstrates that as s2 decreases, s1 must increase at an increasing  rate  to meet the
ambient constraint provided this constraint is concave (a convex constraint would correspond to the
unlikely scenario where an input has a larger marginal impact on ambient pollution when it is used
sparingly than when it is used copiously). Therefore,  S1(s21 *)  is globally convex under these conditions.
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Appendix B:
Numerical Examples
Consider the following numerical example  involving only two types of land and a single  production
input. The single input case greatly simplifies the analysis and renders unnecessary the assumptions
regarding the marginal input productivities and the homotheticity off  (.).  The breakdown of land types
is shown in the illustration below.
Production functions, per acre pollution functions, and the ambient pollution function are shown in
the left-hand column of the table below.  Parameter values are  shown in the right-hand  column.  All
regularity conditions mentioned previously are satisfied here. Also notice the production functions are
strictly concave and the ambient constraint is concave (see discussion in appendix A).
CASE 1
Consider the case where y = 2, namely, a large productivity differential. To solve this problem, it is first
necessary to determine whether the S1 solution is feasible. If it is, then it must be optimal. If not, then
the second-best solutions may be investigated to find the minimum-cost contract scheme.  The initial
operating positions for each type of land are as follows:
In  = p  *ln(xl + 1)  - wx1
1  - P  =  10  1
x1 +  1  x  +  1 X+1  X1 +1
=° x  =9
=  11  = 14.03
p2  = p *21n(x2 +  1)  - wx 2
_2p  20  -
^  =  - W  =  -1 x2 +1  2 +1
=  x2 =  19
= 
° = 40.91
The necessary conditions for an S1 mechanism are given by:
n  *(9ll/axlk)  =  n2 * (a2  /a 2k)
h(nlk z(x  h)A,
h(nij, zj(x*))  = A,
PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS:  PARAMETER VALUES:
f,  = ln(xl +  1)  p  = 10
f2 =  *ln(x2 + 1)  =1
PER ACRE POLLUTION FUNCTIONS:  n  = 3
Z1(X1) = 13X1  n2 = 2
Z 2(X 2) = 2X2 A
= 30
AMBIENT POLLUTION FUNCTION:  y = 2,  1.2
h(-) = n 1lz  +  n2z2
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S1  = TC(X1)  - TIxl),
S2  = -(x2)  - 2(x2).
Solving this set of equations  gives:
x  = 6.580,  x2 = 5.855, s; = 0.35,  s2 = 8.26  =  Total Cost = 17.57.
While IC2 holds, it is straightforward to verify that IC1 is violated  (i.e., x2^ > x  does not hold). There-
fore, the S1 solution is not feasible.
Next, consider the necessary conditions  for a pooling mechanism:
h(nij, zj(x*))  =  A,
s*  =  2(X2)  - T 2(X*).
Solving this set of equations  gives:
x* = 6.000,  s* = 7.99  =~ Total Cost = 39.95.
Here it is easy to check that IR1 is satisfied, so this is a candidate solution.
Last, consider the necessary conditions for an S2 mechanism:
n *(al/ax)  =  _n *(a 2/ax2)  - n  *(al/ax 2 k)
ah/-ax,  ah/ax2k
h(n,  z=(x  )) =A,
=  2(X2)  - x2(X2),
S1  =  1(X2*)  - ni(X*)  +  S2.
Solving this set of equations yields:
x; = 5.272,  x  = 6.182,  s; = 8.10,  s2 = 7.66  =  Total Cost = 39.62.
Both IR 1 and IC2 are satisfied, so this is also a candidate solution. Furthermore, the total cost for the
S2 solution is less than the total cost for the pooling solution (as expected),  so the S2 solution is optimal
for y  = 2.
CASE 2
It can be shown that the algebraic condition under which the pooling solution is optimal for this problem
framework simplifies to y < 1.6. So consider the case in which y = 1.2 (small productivity differential).
Similar calculations to those presented above yield the following results:
S1 mechanism:  x=  = 7.784, x=  = 5.554,  s=  = 0.08,  s2 = 1.81  =  Total Cost = 3.86;
*  Pooling mechanism:  x*= 6.000,  s* = 1.47,  =  Total Cost = 7.35;
*  S2 mechanism:  x=  = 6.984,  x  = 5.763,  s  = 1.22,  s2 = 1.65  =  Total Cost = 6.96.
However,  IC1 is violated for the S1 solution, so it is not feasible. And IC2 is violated for the S2 solution,
so it also is not feasible. This leaves the pooling solution as the only feasible mechanism,  and therefore
it is optimal for y = 1.2.
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